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Eliminating the price difterenitials  that result from country- and
corrmnmodity-specific  exchange rates ("green rates") would re-
duce farm inicomie  and devalLe fixed agriCultural assets.  This
complicates  thie  difticult  task of reform  that is essential  if there
is to be a unified European market.
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by
Donald F. Lason,  Simon Glance, Bret  Borel,  MerUnda Igco,  and Jonathan CodemSummary
In  1987 the E4iroF  :  Community began the  ambitious  task of  forging  a single market  for goods and
services across the nation?  srders of member states by 1992.  Substantive reforms to the Community's  Common
Agricultural Policy, necessary for a full integration of existing markets remain to be accomplished and have proven
difficult to aihie%e.  The creation of a truly "common" agricultural policy in the EC requires, at a minimum, th,
elimination of price differences resulting from country-and-commodity-specific exchange rates, known  as "green
rates". This paper discusses the variety of policy instruments which complicate the effects of these policy-determined
prices  differences  on crop  production  and the  demand for inputs.  A  model is presented  and  estimated  which
measures both the significant cross-commodity biases created by the multiple policy instruments and quantifies the
effects of removing green-rate differentials in (formerly) West Germany.  While the effects of prices changes on
domestic production are statistically significant in the model, they are shown to be quantitatively small.  Such a result
suggests that eliminating green rates would lead primarily to a fall in farm income and a devaluation of agicultural
fixed-assets, exacerbating the difficult task of attaining reform.Aboli:.hing  Green Rates:  The Effects cn Cereals,
Sugar, and Oilseeds in West Gerlany
by
Donald F. Larson, Simon Glance, Brent Borell,
Merlinda Ingco, and Jonathan Coleman
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Intoduction
Tbe cieation  of a borderless  market  in the Economic  Community  requires,  at a minimum,  that bomogeneous
goods be  priced  the sune regardless  of wbere  they are pr('duced. For  agricultural  goods,  this requires,  among  other
things, the  elimination  of "gee  rates"  and  derivaive policy  interventions  such as  MCAs and  MDAs. Because  of
the multiple  ways  in which  the EC intervenes  in agriculture,  eliminating  green rates  would  not have a uniform  impact
on all craoj. It is agued that  if green  rte  wae elmnted,  relative  prices would  change  only across  broad  dasses
of agrcutura goods,  such  - ceal  and  oilseeds,  but nt  wiin  tdwee  categod.  Since conunmer  subtitotion
unongd  the  major  I  cops coveaed by this paper-cereals, odseeds, ua sugr-  is  imal ac  them aggrepte
groups,  the pimary  t  _pon  to elimnating  green rates will  come fom  poducers.  To the extent that pduicion
is joint, government  poL;cies  wbich  affect  one  crop  directly  create seconday effects  in otber markets;  eiminating
greeo rates  will  rte coresponding  da  d  indirect  effects as  well.
In this paper, a general  restricsedprofit  modl  is psed  and  estimated Resolts  Sprt  the notion  ta
duction  iS joit  and  measurs of  bia  resulting from  fixed  facton  ad  fom  sugar qot  are quantifed.
Estmaton  eWslts  indicate that prices ae saly  imptat  in the sbort-uo, but  mulation results  demonrate
that  the supply  and  input-demand  effects  of eliminating  green  rts  are, in the sbort-run quanttively  small in West
Germany.
Interw  "o  isuruments  and  C 1992
In June, 1985,  the European  Cowmssion issued  a White  Paper enitied "Completing  the kItera  Maket."
The paer oudined 279 directe,  wbich,  if imp_emed  would  crate  a European  matket without  borders. One
hunded  of the diectives dealt with agriculture.  One month later, the Commission  relased  a Greeo  Paper entitled
"Perspectives  for the Common  Agricultral Policy,"  which  provided  a major  review  of the CAP and the escalating
costs of the policy  progmns. In 1987,  the Single European  Act which  amended  the Treaty  of Rome to enable the
adoption  of the refonn  package  was nrafied by all membes; and  in Febnuary,  1988 an agrement was reached  at
the  Bmssels  Summit  to finance  the reforms  to compietion  by the end of 1992.
Article  8A of the Single European  Ac  states that:
lbe  Community  haa adopt  msm  r  ith  the  aim  of progeesvdy
establishing  the inthnal  mrki:'  over a period expiring on 31 December
1992.Me  intenal  market shall comprise  an area witout  inenal  lrntis
in  whihthe  free movemnt  of goods, persom, services  and capil  is
e  red In acoord  withte  provion  ofthsTreaty.
Kelch (1989) points out that an  EC without  borde  has four fundnmental  implicatioos  for EC food and
agriculture:  1) the  hannonotion  of plant ad animal  health  sandards,  and food  labeling,  ingredients,  and packaging
laws; 2) the harmonization  of taxes on food and agricuhlu  prducts  and  inputs;  3) the elimination  of agricultural
bord  taxes  uand  subsidies;  4) temoval of quota, variable  premiums,  and rational  aids  which  are incompatible  with
the 1992 program. Impl  t  of these refonms  would brng about  a single price for agricultural  goods for
consumars  and  produces throughout  the Community  and constitute  a rvision of relative  and absolute  pnces anong
commodities  and countries.  It is agued  below  that. in general,  the proposed  cbhnges  are  likely to affect  the decision-
making  processes of producers more drUcaly  than those of consumers,  leading  to a greater  alloction of
rsources  in prodaco  than in demand. The result  stems  from the multiple  instruments  by which  agricultural  prices
are  suppoted under the Common  Agricultural  Policy.
For the major  aneudl crops,  thre  major  progams exist. Cereal  producers  and consumers  face a legislated
price  substantially  above world  levels  which  is defended  by a variable  levy system. Sugar  producers  receive  quotas
which enable  them to sell a fixed  mount of their production  at legislated  prices higher than world  prices, with  the
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remainu.er  to be exporte.  At world pnces.  Oilseed producers receive aid in the form of an indirect payment to oilsc:d
crushers, due to a binding trade agreement entered during the Dillon-Round of GATT in 1962.
Cereals  and variable levies:  The variable levy program is conceptually straight-forward but, in practice,
it is complicated by exceptions and modifications.  For example, in order to remove supplies which would otherwise
dictate lower consumer and producer prices, cereals are exported with a subsidy roughly equal to the difference
between  world prices and domestic EC prices.  As world prices change, the subsidy, rather than domestic prices,
changes. In the case of crops for which the EC is not self-sufficient, importers face a variable import-tax equal to
the  difference between the intemal legislated EC price and world prices, preventing consumers from substituting
relatively inexpensive imports for expensive domestic products.  The result ot this intervention was to create a single,
higher and more stable farm-gate price (and consumer price) within the borders of the EC.  This simple mechanism
was greatly complicated in 1969.  Obtaining a common level of farm suppon was a stated objective of the CAP at
the  inception of  the EC  and much  progress had  been m'Ale prior  to that date  in removing  border-taxes, but  a
devaluation of the French franc and the revaluation of the German mark in 1969 brought about a major revision in
the way in which cereal support levels were calculated.  Unwilling to let CAP rupport prices rise  by the  12.5%
implied by the devaluation, French authorities continued to use the exchange rate established prior to the devaluation
when calculating commodity support levels.  The Gerinans, unwilling to accept an 8.5% cut in support prices, used
older exchange rates as well--and the practice of using "green" exchaDge  rates (i.e., specifically to prevent common
agricultural prices) was established.
Since support prices in France were lower than those in other Community countries a~d cousiderably lower
than those in Germany in particular, free trade across member borders would have driven up prices in Prance and
lowered those in Germany--exactly what France and Germany intended to avoid.  To prevent this, an amount equal
to the difference (either  positive or  negative) vwas  levied  against trade crossing  French or Gennan  borders, thus
neutralizing the legal gains to trade created by the use of artificial exchange rates.  These levies becane  known as
monetary compensatory amounts or MCAs.  Since that time, green rates have proliferated; there are currently 40
green rates among the  12 members of the EC (Kelch: 1989).  Italy, for example, has one green rate for grains and
oilseeds, ancther for sugar, peas,  and beans, a third for pork, and a fourth for beef and milk.
Sugar  quotas:  The EC support mechanism for sugar is based on a complicated system of quotas, nrles,
legislated prices, and import levies.  There are thlree categories of sugar: A, B, and C.  ProJ1uctioa  of both A and
B sugar is limited by quota.  Both receive a support price well above world market levels which has helped transform
the EC from a net importer to a substantial net exporter  of sugar.  The price support for A sugar is above that of
B sugar and A sugar constitutes the bulk of production.  C sugar is considered excess production, cannot be sold
in the EC, and must be exported at international prices.  Producer support pnces are for A and B sugar ame  set in
ECU terms and then transformed to local currencies using green rates.  The green rate used for most countries is
the same rate that is used for cereals and oilseeds; however, as stated above, Italy uses a separate rate tor sugar, peas
and beans.  The green rate used for sugar support conversion in Spain i  the same as that used for cereals, but differs
from the oilsted  green rate.  A series of import taxes prevents sugar imports from all countries except those that
entei  under the Lome Agreement.
OUseeds and  the crushing  subsidy:  The support mechanism for oilseeds is perhaps the most convoluted.
It has its antecedents in 1 a concession made by the EC durin 4 , the 1962 Dillon round negotiations on the Geneal
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT)  to allow  unrestricted imports of  soybeans and  to limit  the  tariff on
vegetable oils and meals.  At that time, the EC maintained a large oilseed crushing industry but oilseed production
was negligible.
During the  1970s, as the  FC moved toward a policy of obtaining self-sufficiency in oilseeds, the  1962
concession prevented the establishment of a variable-levy system similar to that used in cereals.  In response, the
EC established a system of production aids, or crushing subsidies which are paid to crushers of domestic oilseeds.
Rules guarantee that a large portion of the payment is remitted to farmers.  In addition, the EC stands ready to buy
the oilseeds at a minimun  intervention price.  The program ensures EC oilseed producers of a price substantially
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above world  levels, and  has  been quite effective  in expanding oilseed  productioo.' The indirect natur  of  the
program, however, has created an additional set rf listortions  whereby relative prices of cereals and oilseeds can
differ from country to country even when cereal a)d oilseed prices are both con.  ned by a single green rate.  This
obscure distortion occurs because the support comes indirectly via a crushing subt dy.  Oilseed crushers ae  free to
import and  face world  market prices.  In order to encourage  crushers to  buy t.  mnore  expensive  EC produced
oilseeds, the EC calculates the difference between the world price in ECUs and the suppont price in ECUs.  Sine
the world price changes daily  the subsidy fiu.tuates as well.  The difference is converted using "green" exchange
rates and paid to the crusher, who passes the bulk of the subsidy back to producers.  The fanmer, in effect, receives
the world price --which is converted at the official exchange rate-- plus an ECU-denominated bonus via the crusher  -
-which is converted at the green rate.  While the cereal support price is fuUly  converted using the green  exchange
rates, the farm-price for oilseeds is a strange combination of world prices, official exchange rates,  subsidies, and
green rates.  Hence, the price of oilseeds relative to cereals will differ from country to counry.  Annex A gives a
numeric example.
The use of multiple exchange rates introduces artificial incentives for trade  in oilseeds as wel  as cemeals.
However, since the support price is a weighted sum of international prices converted by one set of exchange rates,
and a production aid converted by another, the corresponding mechanism used to calculate taxes or subsidies at the
border of each member nation is more complicated than the MCAs. The Monetary Differential Amounts (or MDAs)
are calculated so that the cost of the oilseeds are identical to crusbeis located throughout the Fw despite differing
levels of producer support.  Since the market exchange rate may fluctuate as well as the market rate for oilseeds,
the MDAs are also in a constant state of revision and adjustment.  Annex B gives a numeric example.
Profit,  supply,  and  demand  effects of common  agricultural  prices
The creation of a borderless EC requires, at a minimum, the eliminaticn of separate green rates and their
derivative instruments, MCAs and MDAs.  Since the current system of multiple exchange rates and production aids
creates country differences in both absolute price levels and relative ptices, moving to a single set of agricultural
prices will have real effects on consumption and production.
Consider first the effects on profits in agriculture, and therefore on resource allocation between agriculture
and the rest of the economy.  Let x  = a row vector of exchange rate ratios on output prices, and y = a row vector
of exchange rate ratios on input prices, where member A = e,'/e and e,r  is the EC!T!country  exchange rate used for
good i, and e is the market exchange rate.
Noting that some of the A,  and most of the y, may equal one, the aggregate profit function can be written
as:
xQ(6p,yw,q,z)  = Apy(-)-yw()  (1)
where q is a vector of the production quantities for supply-managed crops such as sugar and olive oil, where output
prices (p) and input prices (w) are intervention prices stated in ECUs, and z is the vector of fixed inputs.
Under a borderless EC, A=y,=l, for all outputs and inputs so that the relative, as well as absolute prices
will change.  For example, in W. Germany. where the green rates over-value support prices (see Figure  1), setting
'While the creation of a single-market Europe in 1992  promises potentially large changes in all support programs,
the future of the oilseed regime in the EC remains even more clouded.  In 1989 the EC accepted a GATT ruling in
response to charges brought by the United States that the crushing subsidies violated the  1962 agreement and had
hampered soybean exports from the US into the EC.  In response to the ruling, the EC must either alter the support
program. pay damnages  to the US. or negotiate an alternative setlement.Th~  q <.btJ  z  L.  a.gf  F
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Figure 1: Ratio of gmen-to-market  exchange  raes for cesa1s in selected  C couuies.
the ratio of green-to-market  exdhange  rates to I would  significalty lower all producer  output psices. Generally
speaking,  green rates do not affect input prices direcdy.  A notable exception is in the lvestock sector wvrre
production  from the annual  crop  sector  is used  as inputs  to both  dairy  and  meat production. A notable  indirect  effect
is the influence  that support  prograns have on land values. 2
To the extent  that the inputs  are tradeable,  a borderlss EC may  lead to a reahigmemt  of tax rates  on inputs
as well,  as farmers  will seek the lowest  cost inputs. Augmeting y to inchide  diffeences in effective  tax rues, the
effects on supply and input demand  czn be derived  using the regular  envelope  theowm properies, so that:
t/cUp  - $Lp,yw,q,g)  (2)
Pnd
- -x(%p,yw,q,i),  (3)
where y( ) is a vector  of shon-run supply  curves,  and x(') is a vector  of short-nm  input demand  curves.
From  (2) and (3), it is clear that a borderless  EC with a single real  price structure,  wbere  1-,-l  will lead
Mnhe  model  developed  in this paper is limited  to the major  annual crops only and cannot address  these issues.
However,  the effects of prices changes on the livestock  sector and land prices are discussed in an fonhcoming
extension  of the model  by Ingco and Larson.
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to a change in both  supply andi  input demand  even in the short run when fixed  resou:  ;es cannot  be reallocated. To
the extent that most of the r, are equal to one, supplies  should decline (increase) in countries  where the ratio of
green-to-market  exchange  rates are greater  (less)  than one, since  the supply curves  are monotonically  increasing  in
p.  Input demand should  decline (increase)  as well. Equation  4 provides  the shadow  price on the fixed inputs and
provides  the direction  of the long-run  adjustment:
F(-kP'YW'v1  ~~~~~~~~~~(4) a3  i  r(A.p,yw,q,  8'4
To the extent that the value of the shadow  pnce is reduced  below (increased  above)  the marginal  cost of
the fixed input when  ,yl,  the utilization  of the inputs which are fixed in the short-run, wiU be reduced
(increased)  in the long-run  as these inputs become  vaiable.
The cbange in absolute and relative prices will affect final consumer  demand as well; however,  the
magnitude  of the changes  is expected  to be more  limited  than  the supply  effects  due to the more  limited  opportunities
for substitution.
Consider  the utility maximization  problem:
Max U  = U(s  a.t.  7Apd  - B(S
where  d is a vector  of consumption  levels  and B is the budget constraint.
It is clear from (5) that a change  in A wiU  bring about a cbange  in consumption  levels  thrugh  the budget
constraint,  and, because of relative  price changes,  lead to a price effect on demand. However,  to the extent that
groups of commodities  are separable--that  is, to the exte.  k  that consumption  of cereals  is independent  of the price
of sugar,  or vegetable  oils and meals--these  effects should be quite limited.
For the purposes  of this paper, total budget expenditures  is divided  into expenditures  on sugar, vegetable
oils, cereals, and other goods. While the demand-elasticities  of substitution  among  vegetable  oils are quite high,
under current  policies consumers  face intemational  price levels that are independent  of support  prices. Changes  in
taxes are likely to affect all vegetable  oils eqLally,  so relative  prices among  vegetable  oils are not likely to change.
The substitution  among cereals  may be significant  and support prices do effectively  detenrnine  consumer  prices.
However,  since all cereals  face the same green rates within each country,  green rate changes will again not affect
relative  prices.  Sugar  is a single product  and sometime-  faces  a green rate different  from that applied to cereals.
To the extent that relative  prices within the three groups  do not change,  the only price effects of a price
change  on final demand  will come  through  the substitution  among  the groups  and the income  effects. The demand
cross-elasticities  for sugar,  vegetable  oils, and cereals  are likely  to be small if not zero. In wealthy  nations  where
a small  porti,n of income  is spent on cereals, vegetable  e.,  . and sugar,  the income  effects are likely to be small as
well.
Qualitatively,  the move to a unified market and the abolition of anificial country-specific  prices for
homogeneous  goods should have the following  effects:
I) small changes  in final demand  with little substitution  effects.
2) changes  in resource  allocations  devoted  to agriculture  among  countries,  as well as a reallocation
of resources  within countries  among  crops.
3) changes  in the value of non-t aded inputs,  especiaUly  land.
The remainder  of the paper deals  with  quantifying  result 2 for the major annual  crops,  cereals,  oilseeds,  and
sugar  in (formerly)  West  Germany.  lbe effects  of the proposed  policy  changes  have  potentially  large and  interesting
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effects  on  non-traded  assets  such  zLs land  and ol(der tarmers,  howAver,  ihe etfects  on  resource  adiocatioki and the
resulting supplies  ot' these  goods  will potentially  have  the  greatest effects  oi  international markets and  other,
panicularly  developiig,  countines
Empirical Niodel
Appl:catioiLs  based on duality result. and flexible-torin estimates of jointly produced agricultural products
have flourished in rpcent years and include  Ray (1982). Shumway (1983),  ..  .pez  (1984)  atnd Lee and Chambers
(1986).  The implications of supply-managed outputs, in addition to fixed inputs, was first  rnsidered  by Moschini
(1988) who showed that the restricted profit function given in (1) is nondecreasing in p and in z, nonincreasing in
w and in q, positively linearly homogenous in (p,w), convex in (p,w), continu  is, and twice-differentiable.  Because
of the constrained output vector q, profits need not be positive.
Using the SPEL database, provided by the University of Bonn, flexible output and input-demana groups
were created for cereals (barley, oats, maize, rye, and  wheat), oilseeds (rapeseed), non-quota C sugar, ferti!izers
(nitrogenous, phosphatic, and potassic), energy, and pesticiles; the following groups were designated as fixed outputs
or inputs: quota-sugar (A-quota plus B-quota), ne' subsio.s  ksubsidies  minus taxes), depreciation (on machinery and
buildings),  other inputs  (based  on total  input constar  -price costs  minus explicitly  modeled  expenditures,  and
comprised primarily of maintanence expenditures).  The data covered the period 1967 to 1987.  Aggregate quantity
and price measures were created using divisia indices.
Following Moschini (1988), the normalized quadratic, first proposed by Lau (1974) and subsequently applied
in profit function estimation by Shumway (1983), was chosen as the postulated f.inctional form.  The form allows
for negative profits, and has a Hessian of constants so that global convexity can be imposed and tested.
Choosing one of the inpuits as a numeraire (we chose energy), let
4  *  (y-~x 1,......  -X)  ...  (6)
represent the netput vector corresponding to the normalized prices
*n  (p,w,,...w,_),  (7)
obtained by deflating each price by w,.  Defining
f*  (q,z,t),  (8)
where t is a trend variable representing the state of technology, the normalized quadratic restricted profit function
is written as:
r  +  +  2  (9)
where i,m  =  1,...,  M  and j,n  =  1_...,N;  whet..  x,  c*,  o,  3p.  re fixed parameters.  Note  that profits  are
normalized, that is:
*  Xfi  st  (p,w,qgz)  (  10)
wJ
so that rl(p,w,q,z) is linearly homogenous.  Symmetry is imposed by setting  o.n  _  cX,n,  and (  =
h7it,  ef  a  ,,hshin  iii,,&n  'iat  Larxim  to,  al,
The nlcput tuinictions  can be recovered via the envelope theorem:
aft~  ci  b.P  (I11)
for each of ihte  11 variable netputs,
Ideally  the M flexible  netput  equations  given in ( 1) are estimated  together  with the profit function  given
in (10).  However,  including  the profit function  adds an additional  set of parameters  corresponding  to 1  and  p3
leaving  the  empincal problem  unmanageable.  Because  of this dilficulty,  oaly the M netput  equations  were  estimated
This procedure  still allows  price  and cross-price  elasticities  to be estimated  for all variable  outputs  and inputs  as well
as parameters  measuring  the marginal  effects on constrained  outputs and inputs on variable  netputs.
Lau  (1978b)  first  proposed  a nonlinear  transformation  of the equations  in ( 11),  also  used by Moschini,  which
allows  the property  of convexity  to be directly  tested. Letting  A represent  the M x M matrix  of the ct, coefficients,
the restricted  profit function  will be convex  if A is positive  semi-definite.  Since A is symmetric  and square,  it can
be decomposed  so that A = LDL', where L is a unit lower triangular  matrix and D is a diagonal  matrix. The
elements  of D are called the Cholesky  values  which must be nonnegative  for A to be positive  semi-definite.
Cholesky  factorization  renders  the equations  in 11) nonlinear  in their parameters  and stochastic  versions  cf
the netput  e-quations  as well  zs their  correspor.iing  "Cholesky"  versions  were  estimated  using  a Maximum  Likelihood
procedure  Justification  for this technique  is given in Amemiya (1983), Chalfant  and Gallant (1925), Moschini
(1988), and Weaver  (f83),
Estimation Results
The first two'  columns  of Taole I provide  the summary  statistics  for the model  estimated  in its base-form.
The underly0ie  profit-tunction  is linearly  homogenous  in prices by construwtion  and symmetry  has been imposed.
Pro(Jiciti  is assumed  to be jcillt. Convexity  of the underlying  profit function  has not been imposed  at this point.
T*  suniniarv  statistics  are fair;v go(xi, but not greatly revealing.  The explanatory  power of the equations  are
umilorriil  gow(A.  and only the equation for oilseeds appears to be -.fccted by first-order autocorrelation.
'T'able  I: Summary statistics for estimated normaliz&d  quadiat-c restriced profit function with and without
convexity constraint.
Deperndent  Adjusted  Durbin-  Adjusted  Durbin-
Vanable  R-  Watson  R  '0Watson
Unconstrained Nlodel  Constrained Model
(Grains  0.84  2.22  0.82  1.94
Oilseeds  (099  3.23  0.99  3.04
C-Sugar  0.83  2.09  0.84  2.13
Feritihzer  0.95  2.00  0.95  1.74
Pesticides  o098  2.20  0.97  1.68
Nle.iu-point  price and quantity elasticities and the associated asyniptotic t-scores calculated from the modelThe  offcu  LI  yabolshrig  gremn  rates  Larro0.  et. al.
Table  2  Elasticity estimates at the mean point from estimated normalized quadratic restricted profit model.
--  with respect  to  the M1cC  of  wid- mepect to the quadty  of----
Quota  Otor
Flesiorv  It  Cereals  llseeds  ('..ugSr  Ferftltzer  Peuticides  Eaergy  Susr  Capital  Time  Inpuab  S.ubtdis  LAnd
(email  (U?  0.()7  0.02  .0.25  .0,04  0.03  0.11  0.20  0.06  0.39  0.06  0.09
I1  551  i3.23)  O 74)  (-1  43)  (-2.59)  (0.27)  (0.70)  (0.11)  (4.22)  (0.35)  (0.49)  (0.02)
Oilseeds  ()71  4.79  -0.12  .0.07  0.15  0.42  4  0.42  -2.94  2.27  4  0.79  4.30  3.04
(1.23)  (490)  ( 191)  (427)  (-190)  (3.26)  (3.24)  (-2.67)  (14.15)  (-1.19)  (-442)  (0.83)
C-.ugsr  I.3  .0.62  0.99  .0.23  .0.31  *1.13  -4.44  15.10  .3.05  -3.59  0.54  .36.41
(I  74)  (4,911  (2.24)  (4-.44  (1.38)  (-1.81)  (-657)  (1.98)  (-2.70)  (4.7)  (1.13)  (-1.47)
Fertilizers  0.60  0.02  0.01  .0.83  .0.14  0.35  0.12  .1.44  0.23  0.39  0.05  4.47
(4.43)  (0.27)  (0.24)  (-413)  (-.3,4  (3.72)  (1.69)  (1.116)  (2.04)  (1.92)  (1.00)  (1.79)
Pesticides  0.61  0.23  0.09  .0.93  -1.01  1.01  0.34  .2.66  0.76  1.20  0.06  10.67
(2.59)  (1.90)  (1.3S)  (3.34)  (8.47)  (6.48)  (2.89)  (2.31)  (4.57)  (1.69)  (0.06)  (2U)
Entergy  -2.93  0.12  .0,20  3.75  1.12  -1.62
(.3.97)  (447)  (-1.031)  (4.14)  (5.59)  (-2.84)
Now symmetry  and  homoxenitry  maintaimd.  but convexity  rot  impoed. T-wores, iven  tIn ptodhieses,  am  baed  an asympwdg  standlard  erm.r
are given in Table 2.3  A large number of the elasticities are statistically significant and many conform to a pnon
expectations.  Contrary to conventional  iheory,  however, the model yields a supply curve for oilseeds which slopes
downward in its own price.
Reparametenzing  the model using the Cholesky-factorization method documented in Lau (1978) and re-
estimating the reparameterized model mevealed  a single significantly negative Cholesky coefficient.  The Cholesky
Table  3: Estimated  Cholesky  parameters.
Constrained  Unconstrained
Parameter  Estimates  t-scores  Estimates  t-scores
8,  0.43  0.80  0.88  1.68
822  -()0.16  -2.09
8,1  0.11  1.57  0.09  1.31
8,,  0.69  2.43  0.40  1.91
85,;  -0.00  -0.39  0.17  6.38
Note: LR-statistic from the test that 822=0  against the unconstrained estimated equals 13.40.
'Most  estimated  parameters  throughout  the  paper  have  been  expressed  in  terms  of  mean-elasticities;  the
underlying estimates are available by request.
XThe ff.  1J I  . aN#li  shi  g  ree,i r,ags  Larson, et. al.
coefficients anid the associated  t-scores are  given in the  first two columns of Table  3.  Quasi-convexity of  the
underlying profit function requires that every Cholesky coefficient be non-negative. Setting the offending coefficient
to zero and re-estimating the model a third time produced the second set of elasticities reported  in Table 4.  Once
the  second C  holesky coefficient has  been set to  zero the remaining coefficients ar  all positive.  However, the
likelihood ratio statistic resulting from testing the  hypothesis that 822-0 against the  maintained hypothesis of an
unconstrained value for 822, is significantly different from zero.'  Therefore, the theoretical assertion of convexity
in the profit function is rejected by the data.
Table 4: Elasticity estimates at the mean point from estimated normalized quadratic rest  eicwd  profit model under
convexity assumption.
with repect  to  the  price  of  witb tspect  to tb  qfidty  of
Quota  Ot*r
Elaticiry  of  Cereias Oliaeeds  C-auger  Pertiliuun  Pedcides  Ewrgy  -Sugr  Capital  Tim  lapus  Subsdis  Lad
Cereals  0.40  .0.04  0.01  .0.21  .0.06  0.10  0.04  .I  .0.13  .0.11  004  .0.71
(4.09)  (-2.041  (0.641  (-2.88)  (.3.10)  (-i. 10  (0.23)  (1.36)  (473)  (4.18)  (0.41)  (.JO)
Orliseds  -).46  0.05  .0o0  0.24  0.06  0.12  .0.04  -3.62  2.54  .0.56  .0.21  11.83
,.2 041  098i  (40.63)  (153)  (1.41)  (1.65)  (433)  (-261)  (12.11)  (466)  (-2.35)  (2.61)
(8  4)n  06  I (o  0.06  .0.17  -1.41  -4.25  15.64  -3.00  -3.92  0.59  -31.70
0 64 i  (  63)  (717)  (0 06)  (4168  (-2.31)  (-74)  (2.22)  (-2.85)  (491)  (1.29)  (-1.42)
Femil.ize  4.  0 05  0.00  -0.60  .0.13  1.16  0.08  .1.19  0.20  0.77  0.04  3.78
(2.8ss  (I  53)  (0L06  (-3.05)  (-2.69)  (2.94)  (1.12)  (-1.50)  (1.71)  (1.61)  (0.78)  (1.47)
Pesncides  090  9  0 In  .05  083  1.04  2.72  0.19  2.31  0,67  1.06  0.02  7.61
I. Io)  I  'I  ((68)  )2  ,69i  ,-8.65  (4.21)  (1.61)  (-174)  (3.46)  (1.30)  (0.25)  (1.79)
1Energt  ,  IQ  0  04  .009  2.76  1.08  -4.10
(  76)  , 0 59  1  0  (A)  (2.98)  (4.68)  (-.00)
Noe  symmetr  and horngeneit  maintained and conventvy impoed.  T-scores. given in  parentheses,  ae  baend  on uympwtic  standrd  error.n
Setting aside for the moment the implications of rejecting convexity in the underlying profit function, the
model results are otherwise quite appealing.  The summary statistics of the restricted model are given in the third
and  fourth  columns of Table  1.  The statistics  are comparable to the earlier results and  the  goodness-of-fit as
measured by the R 2 remains essentially unchanged.  Most of the mean-point elasticities reported in Table 4 are of
the correct sign and significant.  As a result of the convexity restriction, all own-price elasticities are of the correct
sign and tcur of the six are statistically highly significant. Gtains, oilseeds and fertilizer use are price-inelastic, while
non-quota C-sugar exhibits a unitary price elasticity, and energy and pesticide use are price elastic.  Ignoring cross-
effects,  the table suggests that an across-the-board cut  in EC support prices in West Gefmany would not affect
production  output of  the major crops (cereals and  oilseeds) in the short-run, but would have a  larger effect on
variable inputs such as pesticides and energy.
'The likelihood ratio statistic is asymptotically distnbuted as a Cti-Square variable with degrees of freedom equal
to the number of constraints (Gal!ant and Holly [19801 or Spanos [19861.t  In this case the number of constraints
equals  1.  Since the LR-statistic = 13.40 while X'0,,,  = 6.635, the constrained model is rejected.
UT'hi  ele,  ts  of  '.'i-  O
5
is  e  Ifrse  'au.i  ZPr.in  ri  al
Jointness in production
Inherent in the model is the assumption of jointness in crop production.  Behaviorly, the assumption implies
that vaanous  pr(otuction activities are not independent operations, but rather production and mput decisions concerning
one  output influence the  production  of  other outputs  l'his  can nse  from joint  economies  (land-rotation is an
example) or fTron  shared fixed resources.  The assumption is intuitively appealing since, in the aggregate, much of
the fami-land in West Germany is suitable for a number of crops.  From a policy analysis perspective, jointuess in
crop production his  important implications since policies specifically targeting one crop will have direct spill-over
effects for other crops.  From a modeling perspective, jointness in production complicates the practice of recovering
elasticities by adding a large number of cross-terms, thereby reducing the degrees of freedom for a fixed sample of
data.  Econometrically, the implication is for less-efficient estimators, especially in the presence of multicollinear.ty.
In the context of the present model, jointness in production has two implications.  The first is the general
notion that unrestnicted supplies are independent of the
output  prices  and  supply-managed  outputs  of  other
crops,  Nested in this  general  notion is  the  specific  Table  5: Likelihood ratio statistics for non-jointness tests.
claim  that the  supplies  of  grains, oiLseeds, and  non-
quota sugar are independent of quota sugar production.  Critical
The  first  hypothesis  can  be  tested  against  the  Test  LR Statistics  XO
maintained hypotheses of the base-model by restricting
nine  of  the  cross-elasticities  to  zero.  Testing  the
second  notion  requires  restricting  three  of  the  Nonjointness  35.95  21.66
parameters  to  7ero.  The  results  given  in  Table  5
indicate that both  altemative models  of  nonjointness  Nonjointness for  29.39  11.34
can be rejected with a high degree of confidence.  sugar quota
The  strong  indication  of  jointness  in  West
German agricultural production implies that quotas on
sugar  prodluctioti  not  only  create  the  direct
inefficiencies associated with sugar production, but cause distortions in the grains and oiLseed  markets as well. Tiese
distortions come in the fomi of less-than-optimal production levels, and secondarily. through misallocation of variable
inputs as well  Measures indicating the extent of these secondary distortions are presented later.
Dynamic production
It is the static  optimization problem  which gives nse  to many of  the properties of  the restricted profit
function  as well  as tthe denrved  supply  and  input-deniand  schedules.  For a given  state  of  available  technology  and
fixed  inputs. the  famier  is hypothesized  to optimize  his profits  for a  single  period.  While  the  mathematical
translation of' propo  sed economic activity is somewhat stylized, this standard assumption is perhaps most applicable
to the West German farmer growing annual crops who knows with limited uncertainty the price he will receive for
his produce and who is free to adjust his crop-mix at the beginning of every season.
The implication of static-optimization is that decisions this year are independent of last year's  decisions,
exclusive of net changes in fixed assets such as capital.  This assumption can be tested directly from the data by
adding a vector of lagged-endogenous variables to the model and testing the sigrnficance of the addition.  Table 6
presents the results of such a test.
The static-independence hypothesis is rejected with a high level of confidence  Unfortunately. while the
results of  the single-penr(i  optimnization  penod  Aould suggest that lagged-endogenous variables  should not  be
significant. the significance of the lagged variables does not. in itself. imply any specific alternative theory.  Epstein
I191). tChambers  tI  102.  and Chanibers and Lopez (1Q984!  have derined dynamic altematives to the static model
but empincal applications have been quite limited.  'The inclusion of dynamic elenients in agncultural production
currently remains an ad hoc pr(ocedure
I(TX  ffeI.T of  N,hShshmr,  4r,'e  ',tev  Larson  of  af
Table 6  Test  statistics  on  sigruticance  of  lagged
endogenous  vanables
'I'he  significance  of pricing  policies
Before  proceedmig  to the ettecLs ot priinvg  and  Lagged
quota  policies,  it is perhaps  hest  to ask zi miore general  F3,idogenous  Parameter
*:-uestion  Do  prices  matter  in  the  short-run.I  The  *  Vanable  Estimate  t-score
existence  of  short-run  price  etfects  arr  generally  taken
as an article ot  taith among ecoriomists. howe er. the
fervor of belief is not always shared by policy makers.  (irans  *().24  -0.92
In the context of the model, the significance of shori-  ()ilseeds  0.72  -4.43
run  pnce  effects  can  he  tested  by  constraining  the  C-sugar  0.47  51.8
parameters on all variable inputs and  outputs to zero.  Penicides  0.47  1.08
The summary statistics resulting from  a model which  Pesticides  0.47  13.08
binds the pnce parameters to zero are given in Table 7,
along  with  results  from  a  model  used  to  test  the  Note: the LR-statistic testing the hypothesis that all
opposing extreme  hypothesis that only prices matter.  five parameters equal zero is  110.69; since
The LR-statistics, for tests of the hypotheses against the  X$00=15.086 the hypothesis is rejcted.
maintained assumptions of the base-model are given in  __
a note to the table.
Surprisingly, dropping the price variables on all variable inputs and outputs from the model has a negligible
effect on the summary  statistics.  The adjusted R's  drop slightly and the  DW statistic iumproves  for the oilseed
equation.  The same is not true when the  fixed supply and input variables are dropped  from the equation.  The
explanatory power drops significantly for all equations.  The DW-statistics deteriorate as well.
However, as can be seen in Table 8, the original model performs significantly better than either of the
altemative models.  Both the hypothesis that prices do not matter and the hypothesis that only prices matter can be
Table 7. Summar)  statistics for estimated normalized quadratic restricted profit function under the assumption that
prices do not matter and the altemative that only prices matter.
Dependent  Adjusted  Durbin-  Adjusted  Durbin-
Variable  R 2 Watson  R'  Watson
Prices-do-not-matter model  Only-prices-matter model
Grains  0.83  2.22  0.57  0.87
OiLseeds  (.98  2.21  0.09  0.19
C-Sugar  0.80  1.67  0.55  1.47
Fertilizer  0.92  1.77  0.77  0.59
Pesticides  0.92  1.12  0.67  0.37
Note: Both altemative hypotheses, that the coefficients on all pnce variables equal zero, and altematively, that
the coefficients on all non-price variables equal zero, were rejected with a high degree of confidence.  The LR-
statistic based  on the  test  that all  price-coefficients equal  zero was 67.62  compared  to  the  critical value
X'`, 0=30.58. while the LR-statistic associated with the altemative only-pnce-matters hypothesis was 199.7
compared to a critical value. X",,,=50.892.
IIThe effecu of abC~luhsng  green  rates  Lars5n,  ,t  0l
rejected with high degrees of confidence.
Measures  of bias in resource  allocation
In a  multiple output model of  agricultural production direct indicators of  resource misallocation can be
recovered from the estimated parameters.  Following Lau (1978a), Weaver (1983), and Moschimu  U1988)  define the
indirect Hicks'  neutrality as the following condition:
9)  }.  - o  °  (12)
wbere (i,m) represent any pair of variable netputs, and li.  is the sth variable quantity (s-i,m)  with respect to the
fixed factor.  Note that when indirect Hicks' neutrality holds the ratio of unconstrained production or input-demand
quantity choices is unaffected by fixed inputs or supply quotas.  Also, the same condition can be applied to the
technology variable to measure biasing effects in technology.  Defining the bias measure:
-~  *8  (13)
T'be constraining level of £ does not bias the mix between two netputs when B",, = 0.  When B" 1 ,  > 0, the constraint
biases the ratio in favor of netput i and against netput m; when B",, < 0, the constraint generates a bias against netput
i and in favor of netput m.
Table  8 provides  the estimated  pair-wise measures  of bias  derived  from  the indirect Hicks'  neutrality
condition.  The asymptotic t-scores are reported in the table as well. Perhaps surprisingly, a large number are highly
significant.  Changes in the quota levels for sugar would substantially alter the production mix away from C-sugar
and in favor of oilseeds and cereals.  The ratios of C-sugar production relative to pesticide and fertilizer demand
would decline as well.  These results seem logical as an increase in the quota would result primarily in a shift of
C-production into quota-sugax production rather than a general increase in sugar production of both types.  Changes
in the quota allocation would have little effect on the mix between oilseeds and cereals.  A decline in existing capital
would cause a decline in C-sugar production relative to cereals and oilseeds, as well as a decline in cereals relative
to oilseeds.  Changes in technology at the mean-point generates a bias in favor of oilseeds over cereala as well as
a greater use of fertilizers and pesticides relative to cereal output.  A general increase in land availability would
appear to favor oilseeds primarily.  The biases generated by net subsidies (subsidies minus taxes) are not large but
do generate a significant bias in favor of sugar production vis-a-vis cereal and oilseed production and also generate
a small bias in favor of cereals over oilseeds.
The effects of abolishing  green  rates
In  order  to  quantify  the  effects  of  eliminating  the  policy-determined  difference  between  market  and
agricultural green rates, six years (crop years  1980/81-1985/86) of EC crop production  was simulated under two
scenarios.  Under the baseline scenario, prices were kept at historic levels.  tinder  the second, policy prices were
reproportioned to reflect market exchange rates.  This assumption is no doubt extreme, and it is more likely that a
policy which eliminates green rates will be accompanied by either off-setting direct payments to farmers or a general
upward revision of policy prices.  However simulations of the extreme case re-inforce the general conclusion that
short-run production-effects resulting from the policy will be quantitatively small.
Table 9 provides the policy exchange rates for rapeseed and cereals, the market exchange rates as well as
the changes in policy prices implied by setting green rates equal to market rates for the period under consideration.
Under the second scenano the effects of the changes in policy prices on farm prices were assumed to translate in
12The rffels  qf abolsituig  greea rages  LarMO,.  to a1.
Table 8: Estimated poir-wise measures of bias for constraining variables at mean-poinx
Nerpul  Susu-quota  Cptal  Tecbnology  Ohr  lepum  LAW  Net Subsida
Pau  c  qmate  "rCco  q  tmdaIe  t.cae  caedoaee  I4-Wtm  mau  tocaseta"  I-tcom  mtab  $.*mm
(efyal.aAM"Iie  0.07S  0.410  4.500  3.018  *2.671 -10.106  0.450  0.443  .1.538  -2.783  0.238  1.9S6
Ce,ralWK.Suger  4.289  7.237  .14.457  *2.076  2.S61  2.796  3.306  0.906  30.964  1.386  .0.542  -1.255
(emaifiertnilizers  -0.041  *0.229  2.374  1.9S6  .0.334  -1.527  -0.50  -1.101  .4493  .1.707  0.006  0.053
CeteaillPa4iles  4.152  40.779  3.491  2.20i  .0.7  -3.063  *1.161  .1.141  J5.323  *1.929  0.04  06130
Oll eed(Cnls  -0.078  -Q410  -S40  .3.011  2.671  10I006  0450  40.443  12.38  M73  .. 25  -1.956
OrileedaC-Suger  4.211  6.575  -19.257  -2.666  5.532  5.153  3.357  0.746  43.522  1.S96  0.799  1.721
Oilaeds/Ferthzt,  IS  1  -0.829  -2.426  -1.526  2.337  9.S49  -1.330  *1.372  5.044  .I6  .. 250  -2.471
Otii#rdiPtstdclds  .0.230  -1.141  .1.306  .0S350  1.S64  5.552  -1.617  .1.170  4.215  0.15  4.232  -1.623
C-Sug.r/Cemyals  *4.289  .7.237  14.457  2.076  -2LS61  *2.796  -3.06  4.906  30."4  .1.116  0542  1
C-Sugarlliseea  4.211  46.575  19.257  2.614  -5.532  -5.153  *3.357  4766  *43.322  *1.39  0.7"  1.721
C-Sugsrd1ki1iznr  -4.330  -085  16.531  2.335  .3.195  *3.047  4636  -1.097  -35.478  *1.593  0.  1.23
C-Sugr/Pestcides  A4.441  -7.293  17.94S  L634  -3.668  .3.614  41974  120L4  -39307  1.827  05  1.290
Fertiltizenaereal  0.041  0.229  .2.374  -1.9S6  0.334  1.527  Q.S0  1.101  4.493  1.707  4006  4.053
PFrtatuersA)ilmeds  0.118  0.829  2.426  1.526  .2.337  4.S49  1.330  1.372  .8.044  41.56  0.0  2.471
Fe,tlizrzm/C.Sugar  4.330  6,558  -16S.31  -2.3S8  3.195  3.047  4.686  1.097  35.478  1.543  4.549  -1.206
Fertilize.sAPe,4cides  4.112  -1.395  1.117  1.233  -0.472  -3.604  4U08  40.502  .3.829  -1.341  0.017  0.315
Pesncidr  f/ereals  0.152  0.779  -3.491  -2.206  0.507  3.063  1.168  1.141  8.323  1.929  4.024  .0.180
Pe ncid  ie"  eds  0.230  1.141  1.3t)t  0.530  -1.S64  -5.552  1.617  1.170  -4.215  0.578  0.232  1.62
Peancidn/dCSupr  4.441  7.293  -17.948  -2.634  3.666  3.614  4.974  1.204  39.307  1.827  .4X6  1.290
Pesacidrnfler4iizeru  0.112  1.395  -1.117  *1.233  0.472  3.604  0.28  0502  3.829  1.341  4.017  4.315
T-scoms arc but  on uaympko*  su.dad  enon
Table  9: Effects of abolishing green rates on West German policy prices
percentage change in
Crop  green rate  market  effective policy prices
Year  rapeseed  cereals  rate  rapeseed  cereals  C-sugar
- ---------- DM/ECU ---------------  ------------  % change ------------
1980/81  2.752  2.752  2.518  -9.3  -9.3  0.0
1981/82  2.657  2.657  2.434  -9.2  -9.2  0.0
1982/83  2.575  2.575  2.315  -11.3  -11.3  0.0
1983/84  2.515  2.528  2.252  -11.7  -12.3  0.0
1984/85  2.450  2.453  2.231  -9.8  -9.9  0.0
1985/86  2.385  2.398  2.169  -10.0  -10.5  0.0
Source: Herlihy et. al. (1989)
the following way.  Since C-sugar must be exported at international prices, eliminating green rates would have no
direct effect on prices received by fafmers.  Since green rates are applied directly to intervention prices for cereals,
eliminating green rates would reduce cereal prices by the full 9- 10% given in Table 10. Since green rames  are applied
only to the crushing-subsidy portion of the rapeseed pnce, roughly 50% of the change in the policy price would be
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passed on to farmers.
Th!  results of the earlier sections create a dilemma when choosing the appropnate  model to simulate the
policy chaiges.  The hypotheses that  prices matter in the short-run  and that West German  agriculture  exhibits
jointness-in-production  are supported by the data, and all estimated models reported earlier explain a large portion
of the deviation  in the data.  At the same time, the data did not support the hypothesis of quasi-convexity in the
underlying restricted profit function, nor did it suppont the insignuficance of lagged dependent variables implicit in
a static-optimization problem.
Under  the working  assumption  that it is generally best to impose theory  on the data, the tesults of the quasi-
convex restricted profit function model are reported in Table 11. Hedging all bets, simulation results from the model
without convexity restriction as well as the dynamic version of the model are reported as well.
Two  general conclusions emerge  across all three simulations.  The first is that substantial  reductions  in
Table  10: Simulated annual percentage  changes in selected variables  under  no-green-rate  scenario.
Mean  Stdv. of  Minimum Maximum
Change  Change  Change  Change
------  Convexity imposed -----------
Supplies of
cereals  -1.70  0.25  -2.04  -1.39
oilseeds  1.80  0.58  1.01  2.59
C-sugar  -3.13  1.24  -5.51  -2.08
Input demand for
fertilizer  -2.20  0.33  -2.69  -1.81
pesticides  -3.30  0.59  -4.25  -2.58
---------- Convexity not imposed ----------
Supplies of
cereals  -4.88  0.13  -1.07  -0.71
oiLseeds  -1.59  0.53  -2.38  -0.88
C-sugar  -5.60  2.31  -10.10  -3.77
Input demand for
fertilizers  -2.89  0.44  -3.56  -2.38
pesticides  -2.81  0.53  -3.66  -2.20
--------------- Dynamic model -------------
Supplies of
cereals  -0.56  0.09  -0.70  .0.46
oilseeds  -0.25  0.11  -0.44  -0.13
C-sugar  7.79  4.49  4.71  16.22
Input demand for
Fertilizers  -3.23  0.59  -4.12  -2.46
Pesticides  -4.31  1.26  -5.92  -2.44
support prices through a reduction of green rates wil. have a quantitatively negligible impact on output for crops.
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Recalling that the models fit very well, explainung 80.-90%7  of the deviations in the underlying data, the simulated
differenc-s  ui supplies  and input demand  are still within a reasonable  range of model  error, ranging  from 0 to 7%.
The result stems from the low price elasticity  for cereal and from the uneven  way in which green rates affect the
three crops modeled. The pnce changes caused by eliminating  green rates are only partialy passed on to oilseed
prices (via the crushing  subsidy).  non-quota  C-sugar  prices are unaffected,  and while cereal producer  prices receive
the full impact of the policy  revision,  cereal supplies  are inelastic  in the short-run.
The second resul; consistently  reported  across all three scenarios  is that eliminating  green rates, with  the
consequential  reduction  in cereal and oilseed producer prices, will lead to a reduction  in fertilizer  and pesticide
applications  as well as application  rates.  To the extent that fertilizer  runoff  and pesticide  use generate  negative
externalities,  eliminating  West German green rates will result in positive environmental  gains producing  effects
beyond  the normal consumer  and producer  welfare  changes.
The three simulations  offer conflicting  results as to the relative changes among the crops.  Under the
convex-static  model simulation,  cereal production  declines,  while substitution  effects dominate  in oilseeds,  leading
to a small increase  in production. In the unrestricted  version of the static model, production  of all three crops
decline. The dynamic-version  of the unrestricted  model, price cuts in oilseeds  and cereals  lead to reduction  in the
production  of those crops and a substitution  of productive  resources  into C-sugar.
Concluding  remarks
The empirical  work presented  in this paper indicates  that the short-run  production  effects of eliminating
green rates  on supply  and input-demand  for  cereals, oilseeds,  and  sugar in West  Germany  would  be relatively  small.
Despite  some savings  from reduced  input applications,  the net effect will therefore  be a reduction  in farm income.
The price effects and the resulting  income  effects will be disproportately  distributed  among  producers,  conversely
reflecting  the disproportioned  benefits  of the current system. Producers  of cereals  have the most to lose by the
change. At the same  time the analysis  convincingly  supports  the notion  that crop production  in the EC is joint and
that policies  aimed at one sector  of agriculture  have created  secondary  re. ults in other  markets. The quota for sugar
perhaps  best exemplifies  how a policy aimed  at one crop  in agriculture  spills  over  into production  decisions  for other
crops. In addition,  other policy  interventions,  such as tax-code  provisions  and direct subsidies  are shown  to create
distortionary  effects as well.
Policy  interventions  which  have remained  in place over  a number  of years  distort the accumulation  of fixed
resources  which  have lasting effects. The empirical  results  indicate  that distortions  generated  by the inappropriate
accumulationl  of capital generate  biases as well.
Generally  speaking,  the results  show that the immediate  gains in efficiency  resulting  from supply changes
7re quite limited relative to the immediate  costs in terms of price and income reductions  faced by West German
farmers--despite  quite substantive  indications  of resource misallocations. Therefore,  the prospects  of long-term
efficiency  gains must motivate  policy  aecision-makers  to undergo  a difficult  period of adjustment  in the short-run.
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APPENDIX A.
The Effects of a Currency Realignment on Relative Prices
Consider two crops, rapeseed and wheat, in the UK facing a wrrency  devaluation of 20%, where:
Pre-devaluation:
Wheat target price  357.7 ECU
Rapeseed target price  464.1 ECU
Representative world price  183.5 ECU
Rapeseed production aid  280.6 ECU
Converting prices to the national currency:
Green rate:  0.61865
Market rate:  0.66899
Rapeseed world price (183.5 *  0.66899)  122.73
Rapeseed production aid (280.6  *  0.61865)  127.23
Rapeseed target price in national currency  249.96
Wheat target price in national currency: (357.7 *  0.61865)  221.29
Post-devaluation
Rapeseed world price (183.5  * 0.80279)  147.32
Rapeseed production aid (280.6 * 0.61865)  127.23
Rapeseed target price in national currency  274.55
Wheat target price in national currency: (357.7 *  0.61865)  221.29
Conversion of world prices for rapeseed at market rates of exchange allow the full impact of the devaluation to be
translated into the national currency. Production of rapeseed has become more attractive (due to higher output prices,
expressed in the national currency) relative to wheat.
Source: CAP Monitor
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APPENDIX B.
Calculation of Monetary Differential Amounts
1. Rapeseed Target prices and published rates of aid (ECU/lOOkg)  on 02/15/85
Target Price  Aid  World Price
50.38  11.04  39.340
2. Exchange Rates for U.K. and West Germany
The U.K. green pound is worth more than the market rate of the pound and the German gren  mark is
worth less than the market rate against the ECU.
UK green rate:  1 ECU =  itO.618655 or 'iY = 1.61641 ECU
UK agricultural
market rate:  Yl  = 1.58691 ECU - 1.033651 (CRCF-coefficient)
therefore  Sil = 1.53525 ECU
West German green rate  I ECU = DM 2.38516 or DM  I = 0.41926 ECU
West German
agricultural market rate  DM I = 0.446062 ECU + 1.033651 (CRCF-coefficient)
therefore  DM I = 0.43154 ECU
3. Calculation of Rapeseed Subsidy in national currency without MDA adiustment
UK  West Germany
i. Target price (50.38*green . e)  5[31.17  DM 120.16
ii. Aid (11.04*green rate)  St 6.83  DM  26.33
iii. Net cost in national currency  V24.34  DM  93.83
iv. Net cost in ECU  37.39 ECU  40.49 ECU
v. World price  39.34 ECU
Without MDA adjustment, UK rapeseed is cheaper to UK crushers than is West German rapeseed
to West Germany crushers. The net cost in the UK is below the world .rice  so the subsidy is too
high and vice versa for West Germany.
The coefficient represents a central rate correctinR factor. Starting in the marketing year  1984/85, for each
product, a coefficient (central rate correcting factor), is applied in agrimonetary calculations, including MCA/MDAs.
This is equivalent  to  revaluing the  ECU  for agricultural  purposes and  cuts  positive MCAs at  the  expense  of
increasing negative MCAs. The central rate correcting factor is adjusted following EMS realignments.
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4. Calculauon of the basic MDA percentages
MDA percentages e(qual  the percentage divergence of green rates from agricultural market rates:
UK MDA% =  I - (1.61640/1.53525) *  100% =  -5.286%
German  MDA%  =  I  - (0.41926/0.43154)  *  100%  =  2.846%
If the MDA differs by less than one percentage point from  the existing MDA, the existing MDA continues
to apply.
5. Ap2lication of MDAs to current (spot) rates of aid
The basic MDA percentage  is applied to both the target  price (first element) and to unadjusted  rate of aid
(second element). If the MDA is positive, it is positive on the target price and negative on the aid; if the
MDA is negative, then the reverse,
UK  West Germaoy
Target price  231,17  DM 120.16
Aid  6.83  26.33
MDA first  element  - 1.65  3.42
MDA second element  0.36  - 0.75
MDA adjusted aid  5.54  29.00
Net cost in national currency  25.63  91.16
Net cost in ECU converted at
agricultural market rates  39.34 ECU  39.34 ECU
Where the seed is crushed in another member state other than the one in which it was harvested, the rate
of aid is converted using the rates published in the Official Journal.
If UK rapeseed was crushed in Germany, the aid in DM would be:
UK adjusted aid is:  Y5.54
- bilateral Y/ECU rate:  0.618334
*  bilateral DM/ECU rate:  2.22732  = DM 19.95
Note that this is less than the aid in DM for West German produced rapeseed because the green  rate support
system currently means that UK rapeseed prices are lower than West German.
Source: CAP Monitor
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